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INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)(2) is a simple rule.  A
party that makes a motion under Rule 12 must not make an-
other motion under the rule that could have been available to it
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at the time the previous motion was filed.1  This tiny subsection
of Rule 12 prevents piecemeal considerations of various de-
fenses throughout the lifespan of a litigation and allows cases
to move quickly to their merits.  But how should a court decide
whether a motion was “available” to a party at a given time?  If
the doctrine underlying a defense changes slightly or even
drastically since the initial motion was filed, can this change
disrupt years of litigation and potentially free a party from a
case years after filing?
Rule 12(b)(2) provides an example of one such defense—
the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction.  If, based on cur-
rent precedent, a party (generally a defendant) believes that the
court does not have constitutional authority over it, that party
can seek relief by making a motion.2  The court will then deter-
mine whether it can or cannot hear the case or if the case
should be transferred.  Personal jurisdiction, however, is an
area of law that sees frequent development and change.  A
court could have personal jurisdiction over a certain defendant
who has the requisite contacts with a state one year and then
not have jurisdiction the next.
On January 14, 2014, the Supreme Court decided Daimler
AG v. Bauman,3 adding to its recent body of cases reviewing the
boundaries of constitutional reach over corporate defendants.
Daimler was a case originally brought in the Northern District
of California by Argentinian plaintiffs against Daimler, a public
German company, arising from events that occurred during
Argentina’s Dirty War.4  The plaintiffs premised jurisdiction in
California on the United States contacts of a Daimler subsidi-
ary that distributed cars throughout the country, including to
California.5  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a unani-
mous Court, held that it was error for the Ninth Circuit to
conclude that Daimler was subject to suit by foreign plaintiffs
“having nothing to do with anything that occurred or had its
principal impact” in the state of California.6
Given the extreme facts of the case, this outcome was not
surprising.  Prior decisions would suggest that allowing U.S.
courts to reach large corporate defendants that have only mini-
mal contacts to the state and are tangentially involved in dis-
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)(2).
2 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
3 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
4 Id. at 751.
5 See id.
6 Id. at 762.
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putes between foreign parties could open jurisdiction wider
than the Constitution permits.  The Court reaffirmed its “at
home” test for determining sufficient contact—defendants’ con-
tacts must be “so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it]
essentially at home in the forum State.”7  To give lower courts
guidance, Justice Ginsburg suggested “paradigm” examples of
where a corporation is at home, including the state where the
defendant is incorporated and its principal place of business.
Since Daimler, corporate defendants across the country
have begun to raise motions for reconsideration in pending
cases asking judges to take into account this new, narrower
reading of personal jurisdiction and dismiss their claims for
lack of jurisdiction.  Many of these defendants have been liti-
gating claims for several years, and some did not previously
bring motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under
Federal Rule 12(b)(2).  This forces lower courts to decide
whether waiver of the defense prejudices the defendant or if
Daimler represents a sufficient change in law as to have made it
“unavailable” to the defendant at a prior time in the litigation.
It is dangerous to have courts ruling differently on the question
of whether Daimler represented a large enough shift in law for
parties to claim it is a new iteration of the lack of personal
jurisdiction defense.  It is clear that a defense premised upon
Daimler was “available” to parties at the time Goodyear was
decided.
Regardless of whether a defendant raised a 12(b)(2) motion
with its initial answer or pre-answer motion and regardless of
whether the case predates Goodyear or is currently on appeal,
no precedent exists for allowing courts to retroactively expand
or detract from personal jurisdiction.  In most currently pend-
ing cases, defendants had not brought prior motions based on
lack of personal jurisdiction.  But even considering the strong-
est case for a defendant—a situation where a defendant has
litigated the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction both before
and after Goodyear and has raised the issue again before final
judgment—a renewed motion of lack of personal jurisdiction
should still not result in a complete motion to dismiss years
into a litigation.
This Note will examine retroactivity in applying changing
Supreme Court personal jurisdiction doctrine through motions
for reconsideration in pending civil cases.  The central question
will be how retroactivity is and should be applied in pending
7 Id. at 761 (alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opera-
tions, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)).
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civil cases where challenges to personal jurisdiction are
brought, using Daimler as an example.  Defendants should not
be able to bypass Rule 12(g)(2) and bring renewed motions for
lack of personal jurisdiction years into a litigation by arguing
that their specific defense was not “available” at the time of
filing.  Courts should not apply new developments in personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence retroactively to dismiss claims
against defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Instead,
courts should consider a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 14068 or
other applicable provisions if the court finds itself with a case
now in an improper venue.
Part I will provide an overview of general jurisdiction and
when the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction can be raised.
Part II will examine the cases leading up to the Daimler case
and the Daimler case itself.  Part III will examine procedural
vehicles, including motions for reconsideration, for seeking re-
lief based on the new Daimler standard.  Part IV will argue that
courts should not apply personal jurisdiction law retroactively
in pending cases and provide advice and alternatives for courts
on how to address these motions.  Part V will be a conclusion.
I
WHAT IS GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION, AND WHEN
CAN THE LACK OF IT BE RAISED?
Personal jurisdiction, in its simplest form, refers to the
reach of a court over the parties involved in a lawsuit under the
Constitution or other relevant governing law.9  For a court’s
rulings to have effect in a given case, a court must be permitted
under the Constitution and relevant statutes to exercise its
authority.10  It is especially important for corporations, espe-
cially multinational ones, to know what activities will subject
them to suits in a given state or jurisdiction.  As the Court
acknowledged in two early personal jurisdiction cases, World-
Wide Volkswagen11 and again in Burger King v. Rudzewicz,12
consistency under the Due Process Clause allows corporations
to organize their business with some “minimum assurance as
to where [their] conduct will and will not render them liable to
8 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012).
9 See Danielle Tarin & Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining the Due-Process
Contours of General Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 49,
50 (2012).
10 See RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 50–51 (3d ed. 2012).
11 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
12 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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suit.”13  As such, clear Supreme Court rulings can provide im-
portant guidance to corporations and are necessary for proper
corporate organization.
General jurisdiction subjects the corporation to a broader
scope of liability than specific jurisdiction but still respects
constitutional boundaries.14  It refers generally to an exercise
of authority over a corporation that arises from “continuous
corporate operations within a state” that are “so substantial
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activi-
ties.”15  General jurisdiction gives the state the power to adjudi-
cate any personal claim whether or not it arises from or relates
to defendant’s contact with the forum state. Daimler repre-
sents the Supreme Court’s most recent word on how a court
should perform a general jurisdiction analysis.
To raise a claim that a court lacks jurisdiction to hear a
case against a corporate defendant, a motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction is brought as a motion under Rule
12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or can be filed as
a defense within a defendant’s answer.16  If a defendant
chooses to bring the defense in a motion, it must be brought
before an answer is filed, within twenty-one days after being
served with the summons and complaint.17  Along with other
defenses, a party waives its 12(b)(2) defense for lack of personal
jurisdiction if it fails to either make a timely motion or include
the defense in a responsive pleading or amendment.18  The
Federal Rules also claim that a party making a motion under
Rule 12(b) must not make another motion that raises a defense
or objection available to the party at the time but was omitted
from its earlier motion.19
13 Id. at 472.
14 For a summary of general jurisdiction and its use in federal courts, see
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & ADAM N. STEINMAN, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (4th ed. 2015).
15 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
16 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
17 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).
18 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(B)(i)–(ii).
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)(2). This provision becomes important to the retroactiv-
ity of Daimler because courts are forced to consider whether the decision was an
intervening change in law sufficient to allow parties to bring new motions.
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II
DAIMLER AND THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE LEADING UP TO THE DECISION
A. Development of General Jurisdiction
Each Supreme Court decision on personal jurisdiction
builds off a previous expansion of the doctrine, and under-
standing where the Court is now requires a review of where the
Court has been.  Even in the Daimler case decided in 2014,
Justice Ginsburg did an extensive review of all foundational
cases decided in this area.20 Pennoyer v. Neff 21 is where the
discussion of general jurisdiction begins.  While the facts of the
case are fairly complicated, the holding is simple—the court in
which a defendant is sued must be proper.22  When a party is
within a territory, he can then be subject to its jurisdiction.23
Instead of serving Neff or attaching his land to the judgment,
Mitchell seized the property and only offered minimal notice.24
The focus in the 1878 case was on presence.25  Because the
defendant was not himself or through his property present, the
Court held that the state of Oregon had no jurisdiction over the
action.26
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,27 decided in 1945, is
where the Court first grappled with the differences between
specific and general jurisdiction. International Shoe also gave
rise to the common use of the terms “minimum contacts” and
“fair play and substantial justice.”28  The defendant was a Dela-
20 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753–58 (2014).  Several state and
federal court opinions on personal jurisdiction questions begin with a general
history of these foundational cases.
21 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
22 See id. at 720.
23 See id. at 724.
24 See id. at 719–20.
25 See id. at 724.  The Court presented two ways in which a party could be
subject to a court’s jurisdiction—presence in person and presence by owning
property alone.  If a party is physically within a territory and served with process
or his property compels his appearance, then a judgment will bind him.
26 See id. at 736.
27 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
28 Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  The Court
explained that history suggested that personal jurisdiction had previously only
been premised on power over the defendant’s person, requiring presence within
the jurisdiction.  Now, however, the Court reasoned that because of ease of service
of process,
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’
Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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ware corporation, engaged in shoemaking, with its principal
place of business in Missouri.29  The corporation had no office
in Washington state and did not sell or purchase merchandise
in Washington.30  However, the company employed several
salesmen who resided in Washington and were compensated
for their sales.31  The Supreme Court of Washington held that
the “regular and systematic solicitation” by these salesmen was
sufficient to constitute doing business in the state and thus
specific personal jurisdiction was constitutional.32  The Su-
preme Court agreed and held that these activities were system-
atic and continuous.33
In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,34 decided in
1952, the Court ruled that the Ohio courts could exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a mining corporation based in the Phil-
ippines, but whose president lived, worked, and oversaw
company activities in Ohio.35  Perkins had enough contact with
Ohio for Ohio to exercise its jurisdiction, since the company’s
mining activities were shut down by the war.36  The business
done in Ohio was “sufficiently substantial and of such a nature
as to permit Ohio to entertain a cause of action against a for-
eign corporation.”37
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown38 was the
most recent word from the Supreme Court on general jurisdic-
tion before the Daimler decision.  The plaintiffs in Goodyear
were North Carolina residents and parents of two boys who
were killed in a bus accident outside Paris.39  The parents al-
leged that the accident was caused by a defective tire manufac-
tured in Turkey at the plant of Goodyear USA.40 Goodyear USA,
29 See id. at 313–14.
30 See id. at 313.
31 See id. at 313–14.
32 Id. at 314.
33 See id. at 320.  The Court also wrote that “[the activities] resulted in a large
volume of interstate business, in the course of which appellant received the bene-
fits and protection of the laws of the state.” Id.
34 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
35 Id. at 447–49.
36 The Court wrote that
if an authorized representative of a foreign corporation be physically
present in the state of the forum and be there engaged in activities
appropriate to accepting service . . . we recognize that there is no
unfairness in subjecting that corporation to the jurisdiction of the
courts of that state through such service of process.
Id. at 444–45.
37 Id. at 447.
38 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
39 Id. at 2850.
40 See id.
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an Ohio corporation, and three of its subsidiaries were named
as defendants.41  Goodyear USA’s foreign subsidiaries argued
that North Carolina did not have personal jurisdiction over
them because the activity took place abroad and the company
had no contacts with the state of North Carolina.42
The Court agreed with Goodyear and ruled that general
jurisdiction did not reach the petitioner.43  Justice Ginsburg
looked at several factors:
[P]etitioners are not registered to do business in North Caro-
lina.  They have no place of business, employees, or bank
accounts in North Carolina.  They do not design, manufac-
ture, or advertise their products in North Carolina.  And they
do not solicit business in North Carolina or themselves sell or
ship tires to North Carolina customers.44
For these reasons, the Court ultimately concluded that peti-
tioners are in no sense “at home” in North Carolina.45
B. Daimler v. Bauman
The Court’s next opinion came in Daimler AG v. Bauman.
The plaintiffs were twenty-two residents of Argentina who filed
suit in the Northern District of California against Daimler-
Chrysler Aktiengesellschaft (DCAG).46  They claimed that, in
violation of the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victims Protec-
tion Act of 1991, one of DCAG’s subsidiaries, Mercedes-Benz
(MB) Argentina, worked with security forces during Argentina’s
“Dirty War” to harm MB Argentina workers including the plain-
tiffs and those closely related to the plaintiffs.47  Plaintiffs ei-
ther worked at or had relatives who worked at an Argentinian
plant of MB Argentina.48
The plaintiffs argued that jurisdiction was proper because
Daimler, the parent company to Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA),
is a United States corporation that distributed cars across the
country, including across California.49  MB Argentina was a
wholly-owned subsidiary owned by Daimler’s successor in in-
41 See id.
42 See id. at 2852.
43 See id. at 2851.
44 Id. at 2852.
45 Id. at 2857.
46 See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2011),
rev’d sub nom. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
47 Id. at 911–12.
48 See id. at 912.
49 See id. at 914.
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terest.50  MBUSA, the plaintiffs argued, was acting as Daimler’s
agent.  MBUSA had its principal place of business in New
Jersey and several offices in California.51
Defendant Daimler filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, but the plaintiffs maintained that juris-
diction was proper because of MBUSA’s California and United
States contacts, and the court allowed plaintiffs to take limited
discovery.52  Specifically, over 10% of all sales of new vehicles
of MBUSA in the United States took place in California, and
MBUSA’s California sales account for 2.4% of Daimler’s world-
wide sales.53  In an annual report filed with the SEC, DCAG
disclosed that a “significant portion of our busi-
ness . . . depends in part on export sales to the United
States.”54  These contacts, the plaintiff suggested, were suffi-
cient to subject the defendants under vicarious liability to Cali-
fornia courts.55
The district court ultimately granted the motion to dismiss
after a period of discovery,56 but the Ninth Circuit reversed on
rehearing after initially affirming.57  The Ninth Circuit ulti-
mately decided the case on the basis of agency law, arguing
that MBUSA acted as Daimler’s agent and its contacts made
Daimler amenable to the court’s jurisdiction.58  The Ninth Cir-
cuit was deciding the case before the Supreme Court consid-
ered Goodyear.  The applicable procedure was a two-prong
test—first, whether or not the defendant has requisite contact
50 See id. at 912.
51 See id.
52 See id.; see Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005
WL 3157472, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005) (holding that “plaintiffs’ allegations
do not establish that DCAG has continuous and systematic contacts with Califor-
nia”), rev’d sub nom. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
53 Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 746, 752.
54 Id.
55 See id.
56 See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2007 WL
486389, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007) (holding that “DCAG’s contacts with
California are not ‘systematic and continuous’ and that the court lacks personal
jurisdiction over DCAG”), aff’d sub nom. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579
F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted & vacated, 603 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2010),
rev’d sub nom. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011),
rev’d sub nom.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
57 Bauman, 644 F.3d at 930 (“[W]e conclude that it is reasonable to exercise
jurisdiction over DCAG in California . . . .”).
58 See id. at 920–21 (“We conclude that DCAG has more than enough control
to meet the agency test, because DCAG has the right to control nearly every
aspect of MBUSA’s operations.”).
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with the forum state,59 and, if so, whether exercising personal
jurisdiction would be reasonable.60
For the first prong of the test, the Ninth Circuit was per-
suaded by the plaintiff’s argument that agency law could sup-
port a finding of personal jurisdiction.61  The Ninth Circuit
relied on its and the Second Circuit’s precedent outlined in Doe
v. Unocal Corp., which looks at whether the subsidiary “per-
forms services that are sufficiently important to the foreign
corporation that if it did not have a representative to perform
them, the corporation’s own officials would undertake to per-
form substantially similar services.”62  This test, the court rea-
soned, allows a determination of whether the actions of the
subsidiary are a “manifestation of the parent’s presence.”63
If it can be established that the parent is “present,” this
allows the court to use presence in a state as it had been used
previously—as a way to establish general jurisdiction.  The
Ninth Circuit used this test and concluded that the subsidiary
was of “sufficient importance.”64  The court found that DCAG
relied on selling Mercedes-Benz cars, especially in the United
States where that market accounted for 19% of the sales of cars
worldwide.65  Even more importantly, MBUSA’s sales in Cali-
fornia accounted for 2.4% of DCAG’s total worldwide sales.66
On this basis, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs
established the importance of MBUSA to DCAG and its
operations.
For the second prong of the test, as per Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, the court shifted the burden to the defendants to
show that jurisdiction would be unreasonable.67  The Ninth
Circuit examined seven factors to determine whether or not
this threshold is met:
the extent of purposeful interjection; the burden on the de-
fendant; the extent of conflict with sovereignty of the defen-
59 See id. at 921–24.
60 See id. at 924–30.
61 The relevant question for the Ninth Circuit was determining if the services
provided by MBUSA were sufficiently important to DCAG that if MBUSA was no
longer solvent, would DCAG continue selling cars somehow.  In answering this
question in the affirmative, the court was satisfied that the minimum contacts
test was satisfied.
62 Bauman, 644 F.3d at 920 (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 928
(9th Cir. 2001)).
63 Id. at 921.
64 Id. at 922.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See id. at 924–25.
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dant’s state; the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the
suit; the most efficient judicial resolution of the dispute; the
convenience and effectiveness of relief for the plaintiff; and
the existence of an alternative forum.68
On the whole, the Ninth Circuit found that the first, third,
six, and seventh factors favored reasonableness and the sec-
ond (slightly) and third (slightly) went against reasonableness.
The fifth factor was a draw, favoring neither party.  Overall, the
court found that exercising personal jurisdiction over DCAG
“comports with fair play and substantial justice.”69  The Court
also spoke generally about California, calling it “a state that
has itself become a major hub for world commerce.”70  Thus,
jurisdiction in California was proper.71
Although the Ninth Circuit addressed several issues, Jus-
tice Ginsburg framed the question as a narrow one: Consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment, is Daimler amenable to suit
in California for claims involving only foreign plaintiffs relating
to conduct abroad?72  Having the benefit of Goodyear, decided
after the Ninth Circuit reversal, the plaintiffs relied on the test
for general jurisdiction espoused in Goodyear and argued again
that, in line with general jurisdiction ideals, California is a
place where Daimler can be sued for any claims against it that
occur anywhere in the world.73
Justice Ginsburg reviewed the Ninth Circuit’s holding
based on agency action and concluded that this reasoning
would impermissibly expand the understanding of general ju-
risdiction.74  The Ninth Circuit concluded that MBUSA’s ser-
vices were sufficiently important because Daimler would have
done them itself if not for MBUSA.  This reasoning, Justice
Ginsburg explained, will always result in a court finding juris-
68 Id. at 925 (quoting Sinatra v. Nat. Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1198–99
(9th Cir. 1988)).
69 Id. at 929–30.
70 Id. at 930.
71 In summary, Judge Reinhart wrote that
[i]n light of DCAG’s pervasive contacts with the forum state through
MBUSA, including the extensive business operations of that subsid-
iary, the interest of California in adjudicating important questions of
human rights, our substantial doubt as to the adequacy of Argen-
tina as an alternative forum, and the various issues discussed
above with respect to Germany, we hold that DCAG ‘has not met its
burden of presenting a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion would not comport with fair play and substantial justice.’
Id. at 930 (quoting Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328
F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003)).
72 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014).
73 See id. at 751.
74 See id. at 759–60.
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diction.75  Why would a corporation have a subsidiary if not for
a need that it could not otherwise accomplish?76  Justice Gins-
burg explained that this theory would expose a foreign corpora-
tion to general jurisdiction whenever they have a subsidiary in
any state and this “would sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling
view of general jurisdiction’ [the court] rejected in Goodyear.”77
Justice Ginsburg continued to argue that, even if MBUSA
is at home in California based on this agency theory, there
would still be no general jurisdiction over it because Daimler’s
contacts “hardly render it at home there.”78  The Court took the
opportunity to review its holding in Goodyear. Goodyear, Jus-
tice Ginsburg wrote, was clear in its holding that the places
where a corporation would be subject to general jurisdiction
are limited.79  What plaintiffs want here—to expose the corpo-
ration to general jurisdiction in any state where it engages in a
“substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business”—
is “unacceptably grasping.”80
To further clarify the Court’s holding in Goodyear, Justice
Ginsburg explained that the inquiry in Goodyear is not whether
the contacts are “continuous and systematic” but whether the
corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum
State.”81  In the present case, neither Daimler nor MBUSA was
incorporated or had its principal place of business in Califor-
nia.  It could not possibly be the case that personal jurisdiction
could extend to any state where MBUSA had sales.  This would
not contribute to the consistency that the doctrine had sought
to create.82
Two other aspects of the majority’s decision are worth not-
ing.  First, Justice Ginsburg, in a footnote responding to Jus-
tice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurrence, provided guidance to
courts on how to determine exactly where a corporation is con-
75 See id.
76 Justice Ginsburg borrowed this logic from Justice O’Scannlain, who dis-
sented from the denial of rehearing in the Ninth Circuit. See Bauman v. Daimler-
Chrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011).
77 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011)).
78 Id.
79 See id.
80 Id. at 761 (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 17, Daimler AG v. Bauman,
134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965)).
81 Id. at 754 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131
S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)).
82 See id. at 761.
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sidered “at home.”83  This passage will likely be important gui-
dance for lower courts.  Second, Justice Ginsburg made
reference to international comity and a respect for other coun-
tries’ approaches to personal jurisdiction analysis.84  Justice
Ginsburg even went so far as to cite to sources that expose
“international friction” between countries arising from personal
jurisdiction considerations.85  This is yet another factor courts
could consider when ruling on a motion relating to foreign cor-
porations.  If exercising jurisdiction over the particular foreign
entity would go against traditional concepts of international
comity, a court could invoke this passage of the opinion.86
C. What Daimler Added (or Did Not Add) to the Doctrine
Whether or not Daimler was a significant decision has con-
sequences for how judges should treat motions for reconsidera-
tion.  If Goodyear and not Daimler was the true shift and
represented the creation of the “at home” test still used today, a
lack of personal jurisdiction defense was available in 2011 and
cannot now be used to represent a significant change in con-
trolling law.  If Daimler significantly narrowed the doctrine and
changed the outcome of a personal-jurisdiction analysis that a
court would use with respect to a given party, it would be
proper for defendants to bring such motions at this time.
The decision itself gives some hints as to whether the Court
intended to shift the doctrine in a significant way.  In the ma-
jority opinion, there are indications of whether or not the Court
intended to create significantly new doctrine or simply expand
upon its decision in Goodyear.  Justice Ginsburg writes that
the Court, “[i]nstructed by Goodyear, . . . conclude[s] Daimler is
not ‘at home’ in California.”87  Justice Ginsburg continues to
explain how Goodyear is informing the Court’s decision.  She
later writes,
83 Id. at 762 n.20 (“[T]he general jurisdiction inquiry does not ‘focu[s] solely on
the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.’  General jurisdiction instead
calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and
worldwide.  A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at
home in all of them.” (second alteration in original) (quoting id. at 767 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring)).
84 See id. at 763.
85 Id. (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 35, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.
Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965)).
86 This argument, however, does not appear to be incredibly persuasive.  The
Daimler decision arguably does not improve international relations in the way
Justice Ginsburg argues it may.
87 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 17,
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No. 11-965)).
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Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated
or has its principal place of business; it simply typed those
places paradigm all-purpose forums.  Plaintiffs would have
us look beyond the exemplar bases Goodyear identified, and
approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in
which a corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous,
and systematic course of business.”88
When parties (usually defendants) attempt to convince a judge
that Daimler represented a significant change in the law, they
point to Justice Sotomayor’s characterization of the decision as
“a new rule of constitutional law that is unmoored from de-
cades of precedent.”89  Justice Sotomayor ends her concur-
rence by saying that “[t]he Court rules against respondents
today on a ground that no court has considered in the history
of this case.”90
While scholars and the media may debate Daimler’s impor-
tance,91 nothing in Daimler suggests that the Court was taking
a novel approach to personal jurisdiction analysis.  In a note
written before Daimler was decided, one scholar wrote that the
Daimler decision “will have serious consequences for US plain-
tiffs” because plaintiffs used to look to a defendant’s “continu-
ous and systematic” business activities in the forum state.  If
88 Id. at 760–61.
89 Id. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  A New York Times article written on
the day the Daimler decision was announced uses this quotation from
Sotomayor’s concurrence in its first paragraph, presumably to gain interest from
readers. See Adam Liptak, Justices Raise Bar for Suing Foreign Companies, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/business/su
preme-court-raises-bar-for-us-suits-against-foreign-companies.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/5LUK-KY7Y].
90 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
91 Many news outlets and legal publications reported on the Daimler decision.
Even if the decision was not significant as a matter of law, news coverage portray-
ing the decision as important could have an impact on how parties proceed in
litigation. See, e.g., DWIGHT HEALY & OWEN C. PELL, DAIMLER AG V. BAUMAN: The US
Supreme Court Significantly Limits Where Companies May Be Sued for Claims
Unrelated to Their Activities in a State 1 (2014), http://www.whitecase.com/
sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/alert-diamler-ag-v-bauman-
012014.pdf [https://perma.cc/EK5B-D3X3] (writing that the US Supreme Court
issued “a major ruling that will significantly limit where corporations may be
sued”); PAUL LARKIN, CLOSING THE DOOR TO FOREIGN LAWSUITS: Daimler AG v. Bauman
1 (2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/06/closing-the-door-
to-foreign-lawsuits-daimler-ag-v-bauman [https://perma.cc/C5NU-AF28] (sum-
marizing the Daimler decision); Rich Samp, With Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler,
High Court May Have Put Brakes on Forum Shopping, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2014, 9:00
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/02/04/with-bauman-v-daimler
chrysler-high-court-may-have-put-brakes-on-forum-shopping/ [http://perma.cc
/JY7V-4K6B] (arguing that the decision could result in “major upheavals in stan-
dard operating procedures for much of the plaintiffs’ bar”).
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jurisdiction was truly unreasonable, the Court could decline
jurisdiction on that basis alone.92  General jurisdiction,
Bonacorsi writes, was the “sole door to relief for US plaintiffs
when the minimum contacts approach was otherwise too nar-
row” and the door is “now officially closed.”93  Other scholars
write that Daimler is likely to be a “disruptive case” because the
“‘connectedness’ or ‘relatedness’ requirement is likely to
emerge as the central battleground.”94  The authors continue to
explain that the decision will most affect large multinational
corporations who are sued outside of their state.95 Daimler
now gives corporations a ground to contest jurisdiction in other
ways, including through specific jurisdiction.96
In contrast, some scholars have noted that Daimler is sim-
ply a reaffirmation of Goodyear.  One scholar writes that “[t]he
Supreme Court in Daimler AG essentially affirmed its decision
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.  Through-
out its opinion, the Court relied heavily on its previous 2011
opinion and emphasized how precedent in the realm of general
jurisdiction is controlling.”97  Other scholars have joined Good-
year and Daimler as similar in a discussion of the progression
of the personal jurisdiction doctrine.98
All that Daimler did to aid lower courts in making decisions
on motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was
provide examples of where a corporation will be “at home” in a
given state.  The underlying analysis was unaffected.  Justice
Ginsburg left open the possibility that exceptional circum-
92 See Kate Bonacorsi, Note, Not at Home with “At-Home” Jurisdiction, 37
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1821, 1853 (2014) (concluding that U.S. plaintiffs will lose the
benefits of the U.S. judicial system if they cannot now use general jurisdiction as a
fallback).
93 Id.
94 Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New
Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 228 (2014).  This
Article was written before Daimler was decided by the Supreme Court.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 228–30.
97 Stephanie Denker, Comment, The Future of General Jurisdiction: The Ef-
fects of Daimler AG v. Bauman, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 145, 162 (2014)
(footnote omitted).
98 See The Harvard Law Review Association, Personal Jurisdiction—General
Jurisdiction—Daimler AG v. Bauman, 128 HARV. L. REV. 311, 311 (2014) (“Al-
though some have viewed Daimler as in keeping with a series of recent Court
decisions limiting plaintiffs’ access to the courts, closer examination reveals that
Justice Ginsburg continues to apply a theory of personal jurisdiction . . . initially
introduced in Goodyear . . . .”); Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal
Jurisdiction and the “Interwebs,” CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1136–37 (2015) (noting
that in Goodyear and Daimler, the Court articulated a “similar test for corpora-
tions” and discussing general jurisdiction “[b]efore Goodyear and Daimler”).
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stances may exist, and parties can and undoubtedly will use
this opening to argue jurisdiction.  Any party that brought a
case or filed a motion for lack of personal jurisdiction after
Goodyear was decided by the Court should come out the same
way under Daimler.
D. Daimler Retroactivity
Since the Daimler decision, corporate defendants across
the country have begun to raise motions for reconsideration in
pending cases asking judges to take into account this new,
narrower reading of personal jurisdiction and dismiss their
claims for lack of such jurisdiction.  Many of these defendants
have been litigating claims for several years, and some had not
previously brought motions to dismiss for personal jurisdiction
under Federal Rule 12(b)(2).99  This forces lower courts to de-
cide whether waiver of the defense prejudices the defendant or
if a defendant can raise such a motion at any time regardless of
the case’s procedural history.
The Supreme Court has often considered the question of
retroactivity in the context of criminal cases, but has not had
as much of an opportunity to consider the issue in civil cases.
In criminal cases, where the stakes are arguably higher than in
civil cases, retroactivity is generally disfavored.  If courts are
reluctant to revive procedural rights in criminal cases, it ap-
pears that courts should be even less willing to revive them in
civil cases.100
Since a finding of lack of personal jurisdiction is grounds
for dismissal of claims or even an entire case, defendants were
quick to use the Daimler decision in an attempt to revive previ-
ously-filed motions to dismiss or newly raise a lack of personal
jurisdiction defense.  Most defendants filed motions for recon-
sideration asking judges to revisit denials of 12(b)(2) motions
that were filed at the beginning of the case.
99 FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2).
100 For example, under Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court announced that
new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not retroactively applicable to
cases that become final before the decision was announced unless two narrow
exceptions apply: (1) if the rule places “certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe”; or
(2) if it requires the observance of “those procedures that . . . are ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.’”  As to the second exception, the Court noted that it
should be limited to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an
accurate conviction “is seriously diminished.”  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989).
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Judges reacted differently to these motions.  Some ruled
that Daimler was not a change in law that would warrant re-
consideration—that the defense was available when the Court
first announced the Goodyear test in 2011.  Others argued that
defendants had waived the right to bring such a claim because
they had not brought a previous motion to dismiss within the
time period allotted by the Federal Rules (before a responsive
pleading) or because of their conduct during the litigation
(years of litigating without raising the issue).  Some plaintiffs
argued that the claims could and should be transferred to an-
other court.
1. Timeline of Decisions
The first case to raise Daimler on a motion for reconsidera-
tion was Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Author-
ity, a case that involved jurisdiction over a group, not a
corporate defendant.101  Plaintiffs, family members and the es-
tate of Esh Kodesh Gilmore, a United States national killed in a
shooting in Jerusalem, Israel, initially filed the action in April
2001.102  The case was brought against the Palestinian Interim
Self-Government Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organ-
ization pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991 and other
theories.103  After initial motions and discovery for years, De-
fendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings for lack
of personal jurisdiction on February 10, 2014—only one month
after Daimler.104
In their motion, Defendants argued that after Daimler, they
could not be considered “at home” in the United States.  Plain-
tiffs argued that Defendants waived their jurisdictional defense
by litigating the case for such a long period of time (more than a
decade).105  On June 23, 2014, Judge Gladys Kessler denied
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings for lack of
personal jurisdiction.  Judge Kessler agreed with Plaintiffs and
ruled that Defendants had waived their personal jurisdiction
defense under the Federal Rules.106  As Rule 12(g)(2) provides,
a party that makes a motion under Rule 12 cannot make an-
other motion raising a defense or objection that was available
to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.
101 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 2014).
102 See id.
103 See id. at 11–12.
104 See id. at 12.
105 See id.
106 See id.
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A personal jurisdiction defense, Judge Kessler explained,
was available in 2002 when the initial motions were filed, and
the defendants declined to make it.107  Even if it wasn’t availa-
ble then, she argued, it became available with the Court’s deci-
sion in Goodyear.  The “at home” standard, Judge Kessler
reasoned, was “unmistakably announced in Goodyear . . . ,
more than two and a half years before Defendants filed the
instant Motion.”108  By not raising it then, Defendants had
waived their rights.  Judge Kessler’s opinion reaches the cor-
rect result.  In a case where no personal jurisdiction defense
was originally raised, and when the case has been in litigation
for several years, such a motion to retroactively apply Daimler
should be denied.
An absence of change in intervening law is not the only
reason for denial of a motion for reconsideration.  On August 7,
2014, Defendants in Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd. brought a
motion to reconsider previous rulings denying motions to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The court agreed with
Defendants that their Rule 12(b)(2) jurisdictional defense was
not available before Daimler.109  However, the court reasoned
that any personal jurisdiction defense was waived through the
parties’ conduct after Daimler was issued.  There were several
opportunities for the parties to raise the issue before the court,
and they failed to do so.110
In American Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of New York
Mellon,111 a pending case in the Western District of Oklahoma,
Defendant brought a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, both general and specific.  The case was originally
filed in November 2011, and after amendments to the com-
plaints, an answer was filed on January 10, 2014.  Defendant
argued to the court that in Daimler, the Supreme Court an-
nounced a change in law and that they were precluded from
raising such a defense any earlier even though the Federal
Rules require that a 12(b)(2) motion be brought before an an-
107 Defendants argued that Daimler was a “game-changing decision,” which
was “so ‘widely viewed as changing the legal landscape for personal jurisdiction’”
that they could not have raised their defense until after it was decided. See id. at
15 (quoting Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction at 1, 8, Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d 9
(D.D.C. 2014) (No. 01-cv-853 (GK))).
108 Id.
109 See Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 3419 (GBD), 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 44005, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015).
110 See id. at 24–25.
111 No. Civ-11-1284-D, 2014 WL 4471606 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014), aff’d,
Am. Fid. Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 810 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2016).
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swer.112  Substantively, defendant argued that Daimler nar-
rowed the predicates for personal jurisdiction only to the place
of incorporation or principal place of business.113
On September 10, 2014, Judge Timothy Degiusti issued an
opinion on Defendant’s motion to dismiss.  The court disagreed
with Defendant on both procedural and substantive grounds
but ultimately decided the case on procedural grounds.114
Judge Degiusti decided that the lack of personal jurisdiction
defense was waived when not brought initially.115  Because
Goodyear was decided more than two years earlier, the court
ruled that it was Goodyear that signified a change in law, not
Daimler.116  The defense was therefore waived under Rule
12(h).  On January 20, 2016, the decision was affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit.117
While most judges agree that Daimler did not represent a
change in law, some courts will attempt to make a determina-
tion of whether or not Daimler represented a change in law
based on the facts of each individual case as well as the law of
each individual circuit.  The Second Circuit, for example, mis-
takenly held in Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, that Daimler
“expressly cast doubt” on previous Supreme Court and New
York Court of Appeals cases that permitted jurisdiction on the
basis that a foreign corporation was doing business through a
local branch office in the forum.118
But it was Goodyear that, several years earlier, changed
the legal landscape and disrupted precedent.  Surely a bank
with a branch in New York would not meet the test set forth in
Goodyear that requires affiliations with the state that are so
“continuous and systematic” as to render them essentially at
home in the forum state.119  Simply because Justice Ginsburg
provided two concrete examples of how a corporation could be
112 See id. at *1–2.
113 See id. at *2–3.  Defendant was not incorporated nor had its principal place
of business in Oklahoma.  Jurisdiction was premised on Defendant’s systematic
and continuous contact with the state.
114 See id. at *3–5.
115 See id. at *5.
116 See id.
117 See Am. Fid. Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 810 F.3d 1234, 1235
(10th Cir. 2016).
118 See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135 (2d. Cir. 2014)
(holding that Daimler, decided three years after Goodyear, represented a change
in personal jurisdiction law).
119 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857
(2011).
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“at home” in Daimler does not change how a court should carry
out its analysis.120
In Gucci America, the Second Circuit reasoned that the
district court no longer had general personal jurisdiction over
the bank.  Similar to the defendant in Daimler, the nonparty
bank had branch offices in the forum but was headquartered
and incorporated elsewhere.121  Despite not having previously
raised the defense that the court lacked personal jurisdiction,
the court ruled that the bank did not waive its exercise of
general jurisdiction.122  Prior to Daimler, controlling precedent
made it clear that a foreign bank with a branch in New York
was subject to general jurisdiction in the Circuit because of the
activity of its New York branch. Gucci was wrongly decided and
will create dangerous precedent.
On September 30, 2014, Judge George O’Toole in the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts ruled in favor of Defendants who made a
similar motion to dismiss in Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston
v. Ally Financial, Inc.123  In that case, only one party—the rat-
ing agency defendants—argued that the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims against them.  Defendants
argued that Daimler represented a shift in the way a court
should analyze personal jurisdiction, and Judge O’Toole
agreed.124  Plaintiff had argued in response that if the court
was willing to recognize that it no longer had jurisdiction over
Defendants, it should at least transfer the claims in the interest
of justice.125  After reviewing the various transfer statutes,
Judge O’Toole ultimately decided that none could save Plain-
tiff’s claims.126  Judge O’Toole dismissed Plaintiff’s claims en-
120 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014).
121 See Gucci Am., 768 F.3d at 126.
122 See id. at 135.
123 No. 11-10952-GAO, 2014 WL 4964506 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014).
124 Specifically, Judge O’Toole noted that “[t]he Daimler decision requires a
tighter assessment of the standard than perhaps was clear from Goodyear.”  He
continued to explain that the defendants do have “continuous and systematic”
contacts with Massachusetts, but are not incorporated or have their principal
place of business in the state.  Finally, this case was not one of the “exceptional”
ones described by Justice Ginsburg. See id. at *2.
125 See id. at *3.  Plaintiff argued that the court could transfer the claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 or § 1406(a), both of which would provide for a
change of venue and not a dismissal of claims entirely.
126 See id. at *4.  Judge O’Toole ruled that 28 U.S.C. § 1631 should be read to
only include transfer for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and § 1406 only used
when venue is improper, which it was not in this case.  Because of the uncertainty
of the law surrounding these statutes, Judge O’Toole allowed the plaintiffs to file
an immediate appeal.
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tirely.127  The decision is currently on appeal in the First
Circuit Court of Appeals.
On October 29, 2014, Judge Richard Leon of the District
Court for the District of Columbia ruled on a motion for recon-
sideration of a personal jurisdiction order filed in 2005.128  De-
fendants asked the judge to reconsider the order and dismiss
plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety.  Judge Leon ruled that per-
sonal jurisdiction is waivable and that case law of the D.C.
Circuit supports such waiver.  Through their conduct, Judge
Leon explained, Defendants had “repeatedly manifested their
consent to the Court’s jurisdiction.”129
On December 1, 2014, Judge George Daniels of the South-
ern District of New York decided a similar motion in Sokolow v.
Palestine Liberation Organization.130  Defendants, the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority
(PA), moved for summary judgment for lack of personal juris-
diction after Judge Daniels had previously denied a motion for
reconsideration.  Defendants argued that Daimler served as an
intervening change in the controlling law and that there was no
longer jurisdiction over them.  Defendants further argued that
Gucci changed the Second Circuit’s view, namely that parties
such as Defendants in this case should not be subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction.131  Judge Daniels ultimately decided that
this case was one that could be categorized as an “exceptional
case” because the parties, although not foreign corporations,
were “at home” in the United States and could not show that
they were “at home” in any other location.132
On March 3, 2015, Judge Paul Friedman issued an order
dismissing a case for lack of personal jurisdiction.133  The case
centered on a 2002 terrorist attack that killed an American
schoolteacher.  The teacher’s estate brought an action against
the PA and the PLO for violations of the Antiterrorism Act.  In
2006, the court had determined that it could exercise general
personal-jurisdiction over the PA and the PLO based on their
127 See id. at *5; see also David McAfee, Daimler Frees Moody’s, S&P from
Bank’s $5.9B MBS Suit, LAW360 (Oct. 1, 2014, 9:04 PM), http://
www.law360.com/articles/583381/daimler-frees-moody-s-s-p-from-bank-s-5-
9b-mbs-suit [http:/perma.cc/95JJ-EWEN].
128 See Shatsky v. Syrian Arab Republic, No. 02-02280 (RJL), slip op. at 2–3
(D.D.C. filed Oct. 29, 2014).
129 Id. at 2.
130 No. 04 Civ 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014).
131 See id. at *1–2.
132 See id. at *2.
133 See Estate of Esther Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 240
(D.D.C. 2015).
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“continuous and systematic” contacts with the United
States.134  After Daimler, Defendants raised a motion for recon-
sideration arguing that Daimler was an intervening change in
the law.135  The court agreed.  The court reasoned that Good-
year’s “at home” test was not fully solidified until Daimler and
Defendants in the case had actively fought personal jurisdic-
tion throughout the litigation of the case.136
Yet another district court judge in New York used Gucci as
controlling precedent to hold that personal jurisdiction was
lacking.  On March 31, 2015, Judge Paul Gardephe in 7 West
57th Street Realty Co., LLC v. Citigroup, Inc.137 wrote that Gucci
America “unequivocally holds” that Daimler effected a change
in the law, providing Defendants with a personal jurisdiction
defense that was previously unavailable to them.138  As the
court was bound by that decision, Defendants did not waive
their personal jurisdiction objection by not bringing a motion
earlier.139
III
COURTS SHOULD DENY MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND NOT APPLY PERSONAL JURISDICTION LAW
RETROACTIVELY IN PENDING CASES
In pending cases, parties can use a motion for reconsidera-
tion based on a change in controlling law as a vehicle to retro-
actively apply a new rule to a current litigation.  The standard
for granting motions for reconsideration varies by court.140
Generally, a party cannot bring a motion for reconsideration to
134 Id. at 242.
135 See id. at 239.
136 See id. at 242–43.
137 No. 13 Civ 981(PGG), 2015 WL 1514539 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015).
138 Id. at *7.
139 See id.
140 For a summary of standards in courts across the country, see LAWYERS
COOP. PUBL’G, 3 MOTIONS IN FEDERAL COURT § 9.53 (Wayne F. Foster & Lora Siegler,
3d eds. 1996) (presenting standards for a motion for reconsideration of ruling).  A
2012 Second Circuit case noted that
‘Rule 59 is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the
case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or
otherwise taking a “second bite at the apple” . . . .’  Rather, ‘the
standard for granting [a Rule 59 motion for reconsideration] is
strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the mov-
ing party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked.’
Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156
F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998)) (quoting Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255,
257 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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simply relitigate an issue.  A party must present evidence of a
change in controlling law.  Often the standard for granting a
motion for reconsideration in a given district is high, as judges
are infrequently willing to revisit prior decisions.141
Because the original motions to dismiss, if made, likely
would have been decided several years prior, defendants rely
on different provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
argue that judges have the power to alter such rulings.142  One
such rule, Rule 54(b),143 says that
any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of
the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before
the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the
parties’ rights and liabilities.144
Defendants in the Federal Home Loan Bank case argued that if
their motion for reconsideration were denied, it should then be
certified for interlocutory appeal,145 a procedural mechanism
that the district court would ultimately accept.146  While the
Rule, as written, appears to allow such motions, the following
section will illustrate the problems with this approach.
141 See 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders § 40 (2016) (“A trial court
has jurisdiction to reconsider a prior ruling and may examine several factors in
determining the propriety of such reconsideration, including whether: a matter is
presented in a different light or under different circumstances; there has been
change in governing law; a party offers new evidence; manifest injustice will result
if the court does not reconsider its prior ruling; the court needs to correct its own
errors; or an issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by court.”
(footnote omitted)).
142 For an example of this argument, see Shatsky v. Syrian Arab Republic, No.
02-02280 (RJL), slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 29, 2014) (arguing that the court’s
denials of jurisdictional motions serve as interlocutory orders, which may be
revisited).  The court ultimately decided that Defendants had waived their per-
sonal jurisdiction defense.
143 FED R. CIV. P. 54(b).
144 Id.; see also Nieves-Luciano v. Hernandez-Torres, 397 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.
2005) (“Interlocutory orders . . . ’remain open to trial court reconsideration’ until
the entry of judgment.”) (quoting Geffon v. Micrion Corp., 249 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir.
2001)).
145 See McGraw Hill Fin., Inc.’s & Standard & Poor’s Fin. Servs. LLC’s Memo-
randum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Reconsideration or, in the Alt., for
Certification Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1292(B) at *2, Fed. Home Loan Bank of
Boston v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952-GAO (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014), ECF No.
382.  Defendants also listed several other courts of appeals that have accepted
interlocutory appeals from the denial of a motion to dismiss based on personal
jurisdiction. See id. at *4 n.3.
146 See Fed. Home Loan Bank of Boston, 2014 WL 4964506, at *4.
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IV
HOW COURTS SHOULD ADDRESS RENEWED MOTIONS TO
DISMISS CASES OR CLAIMS FOR LACK OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
There is no clear answer available for judges who are
presented with motions for reconsideration of previously-filed
12(b)(2) motions or summary judgments revisiting similar is-
sues.147  Defendants use different arguments in an attempt to
persuade judges to reconsider prior rulings.  There are several
grounds on which a judge could premise a denial of such a
motion, including waiver of the 12(b)(2) defense because of the
absence of a change in controlling law.148  The exact grounds
largely depend on the procedural history of the case and the
types of arguments that defendants or other parties put before
the court.  There are three reasons why, regardless of persua-
sive arguments to the contrary, judges should categorically
deny such untimely motions for reconsideration.149
First, motions for lack of personal jurisdiction, also known
as 12(b)(2) motions, involve one of the disfavored defenses
available for parties by Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.  Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which must be
present at the beginning of a case and can then be lost, per-
sonal jurisdiction over a party must be established at the out-
set and can only be raised and litigated at that time, not
subsequently.
Second, in the interest of fairness, plaintiffs should not be
subject to motions made based on the frequent changes in
Supreme Court doctrine in an area that could influence the
venue in which a case is heard, which is an incredibly impor-
tant factor for all parties but especially for plaintiffs.  Allowing
defendants to succeed on such motions is incredibly disruptive
after years of litigation in one venue.
147 Ideally the problem could be solved if the Supreme Court, whenever it
hears a case impacting personal jurisdiction, issues clear guidance as to whether
it means to disrupt the current doctrine and substantially change the way per-
sonal jurisdiction is analyzed.  However, it is difficult for the Supreme Court to
identify which cases will have what effect.
148 See, e.g., Am. Fid. Assurance Co. v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. Civ-11-
1284-D, 2014 WL 4471606, at *1, *3–5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014) (dismissing a
motion for reconsideration of personal jurisdiction on the grounds that the defen-
dant waived their 12(b)(2) defense where there was no change in controlling law),
aff’d, Am. Fid. Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 810 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir.
2016).
149 Even if there were a valid reason why a court would not have jurisdiction
over a defendant post-Daimler that did have jurisdiction pre-Daimler, a judge
should still consider fairness to the plaintiffs or determine if transfer was feasible.
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Finally, judges have several alternative options if they are
inclined to rule that personal jurisdiction is now lacking but
that a particular claim should be preserved for any of these
reasons.  If applicable law allows, a judge can transfer or sever
claims against certain defendants with the hopes of keeping
litigation alive.
A. The 12(b)(2) Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Is a
Disfavored, Waivable Defense
The 12(b)(2) defense is known as a disfavored defense.150  If
the defense is not raised in a motion before the filing of the
answer or in the answer itself, the defense is lost.151  In denying
motions for reconsideration for lack of personal jurisdiction,
judges have argued that defendants, in not bringing a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction originally, waived
the defense.  A determination of whether the personal jurisdic-
tion defense is waivable derives from federal law and will vary
by jurisdiction.152
An ideal way to solve the confusion surrounding whether a
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is waived would be to
amend the Federal Rules or a statutory provision.  The Federal
Rules make clear that either a party or the court can raise
150 See 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULES AND
COMMENTARY, at Rule 12 (2016) (“There are four defenses—lack of personal juris-
diction, improper venue, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of
process—that are forfeited if not raised in the defendant’s first response to the
complaint . . . .”).
151 See id.  There are several additional ways for a party to lose the defense.
See id.  (“The defense of lack of personal jurisdiction can be forfeited (waived) in
several ways.  First, a defendant forfeits the defense under Rule 12(h)(1) by not
raising it in the answer or a pre-answer motion.  Second, a defendant can forfeit
the defense, even if it is included in a pre-answer motion, if the court denies the
motion on the basis of a prima facie analysis and the defendant thereafter does
nothing to renew the objection and demand that the plaintiff make a factual
showing of personal jurisdiction.  Third, a defendant can forfeit the defense, even
if it is included in the answer, by failing to press the issue to the court.  Fourth,
the defendant can forfeit the defense by his conduct in the litigation.” (footnotes
omitted)).
152 Two recent decisions in pending cases show this variation.  In Gucci
America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, the Second Circuit ruled that defendants’ objection to
personal jurisdiction was not waived because it was not available at the time.
Under prior precedent, the court argued, a foreign bank with a branch in New
York was subject to personal jurisdiction.  After Daimler, one branch in New York
would not make the bank “at home” in New York.  Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li,
768 F.3d 122, 134–35 (2d. Cir 2014).  In contrast, Judge Richard Leon in the
District of Columbia ruled that the D.C. Circuit recognizes waiver when a defen-
dant has engaged in litigation and brought several motions without raising a
personal jurisdiction defense.  Shatsky v. Syrian Arab Republic, No. 02-02280
(RJL), slip op. at 1–2 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 29, 2014).
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subject-matter jurisdiction at any time during the course of
litigation.153  The Federal Rules should specify that Rule 54(b)
cannot be applied to a change in constitutional doctrine that
impacts a change in venue or involves the dismissal of a party.
As written, Rule 54(b) is too broad and invites parties to chal-
lenge all rulings, even those that would disrupt years of
litigation.154
Judges should not rule simply based on whether or not a
party had previously brought a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.  If it were the case that a party could not
raise a 12(b)(2) defense in a pending litigation because the
party had not previously done so before filing a responsive
pleading, this would have a negative effect.  It would create an
incentive for parties to bring a 12(b)(2) motion or preserve the
defense initially even if it were not clear that it could win or
were warranted.  Parties would be bringing such motions just
to preserve the possibility that the law could change (and it
probably will over a lengthy litigation).  This will lead to unnec-
essary motion practice and overall inefficiency.  Additionally,
under Rule 11, lawyers are not encouraged to bring motions
that they know will not succeed.155
B. The Interest of Fairness for Plaintiffs Must Be
Considered
Even if Daimler represented a tightening of or change in the
doctrine,156 fairness dictates that a change in the doctrine of
personal jurisdiction should not be an interlocutory order that
can be revised.  In almost every pending case considering this
153 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
154 It is odd that parties have not attempted to file similar motions for recon-
sideration based on changes in prior Supreme Court doctrine in realms other
than personal jurisdiction.  And these motions beg the question of whether parties
can bring motions for reconsideration on any of the other disfavored defenses and
have a court dismiss claims.  For example, if the Supreme Court interpreted the
requirements for service or motions to dismiss (which they have several times
recently), could a party bring a similar motion?  Halfway into a litigation, could a
party raise a motion for reconsideration that the complaint no longer adheres to
current Supreme Court or applicable circuit court standards?  This cannot be the
effect that Rule 54(b) was intended to have on parties in pending cases.
155 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).  Rule 11 says that an attorney, in filing a
pleading, certifies that the “claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument.”
156 Judges who are ruling that the “at home” test and subsequent defense for
lack of personal jurisdiction in Goodyear was the change in controlling law are
misguided.  While Goodyear certainly represented a shift in Supreme Court analy-
sis of the reach over corporate defendants, Daimler was the true tightening and
limiting of the “paradigm” places where a corporation could be subject to jurisdic-
tion of the courts.  Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014).
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issue, plaintiffs filed the complaint years prior to any motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  Even in cases where
such a motion was made initially, judges decided in the plain-
tiffs’ favor years ago.  Allowing a judge to entirely dismiss
claims of a defendant who has litigated for years is unfair to
plaintiffs who rely on the Federal Rules to set up a structure to
ensure that such motions are brought in a timely fashion.  Sev-
eral statutory provisions give judges the ability to consider fair-
ness in deciding issues of venue or jurisdiction.157
C. Courts Can Transfer Cases or Claims
In arguing that claims can be preserved if transferred and
not dismissed, plaintiffs in opposition to motions for reconsid-
eration argue that courts have other options besides dismis-
sal.158  Plaintiffs look to 28 U.S.C. § 1404,159 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406,160 and 28 U.S.C. § 1631161 as fallback options for
transfer of claims.162
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) explains that “[f]or the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought or to any district or division
to which all parties have consented.”163  The trial court has
discretion to transfer an action and the burden of showing the
necessity of transfer.164  The court can consider many factors,
157 Each transfer statute contemplates transfer “in the interest of justice.” See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a), 1631 (2012).  Presumably, the avoidance of dis-
missing claims that parties have been litigating for several years would be consid-
ered a ruling in the interest of justice.
158 The struggle for plaintiffs in such motions is the difficulty of overcoming
both the procedural and substantive hurdles.  The plaintiff must convince the
judge that the personal jurisdiction defense is waived for some reason previously
discussed.  However, in the chance that the judge allows the motion to continue, a
plaintiff must then persuade the judge that, under the Daimler test, the defendant
is or is not “at home” in a given state.
159 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012).
160 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012).
161 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012).
162 For an overview of these transfer statutes, available to courts when they
lack personal jurisdiction, see Jeremy Jay Butler, Note, Venue Transfer when a
Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction: Where Are Courts Going with 28 U.S.C. § 1631?,
40 VAL. U. L. REV. 789, 792–99 (2006).
163 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
164 See Annotation, Questions as to Convenience and Justice of Transfer Under
Forum non Conveniens Provision of Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a)), 1 A.L.R.
FED. 15, § 2[a] (2014).
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including convenience of the parties and where the events in
question took place.165
28 U.S.C. § 1406 is another means by which a judge could
transfer a case.  Section 1406(a) states that “[t]he district court
of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong
division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it
could have been brought.”166  One of the difficulties with sec-
tion 1406 transfers, however, is that one of the parties in the
litigation could be a foreign party.  Therefore, the places in
which the case could have been brought are most likely limited.
Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1631, usually used to transfer cases
for which there is a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, could be
invoked as a transfer vehicle if the relevant jurisdiction reads it
expansively.  Section 1631 states that
[w]henever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court
finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it
is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to
any other such court in which the action or appeal could
have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed.167
Some could argue that the benefits to plaintiffs in denying
motions for reconsideration or transferring claims do not out-
weigh the costs of having cases in an improper venue.  Consti-
tutional arguments are undoubtedly more important to
consider than fairness arguments.  However, the two are not
mutually exclusive.  With the ability to transfer cases comes
the ability to maintain both proper venue and ensure fairness
to all parties.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Rules give parties one chance to bring a mo-
tion for lack of personal jurisdiction in response to a complaint.
It is improper for courts to hold that Daimler or any change in
the constitutional boundaries of personal jurisdiction creates
an opportunity for parties to renew these motions for lack of
personal jurisdiction.  Rule 12(g)(2) specifically disallows mo-
tions made that could have been made if the defense was previ-
ously available to a party.  And although Daimler may have
165 See id.; see also Snyder v. Ply Gem Indus., Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 246,
248–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting a motion to transfer venue based on such fac-
tors as convenience to the parties and the location of operative events, among
others).
166 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012).
167 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2014).
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provided more guidance on how a court can determine whether
a party is “at home,” its holding did not fundamentally change
the doctrine from Goodyear, a case decided three years earlier.
Courts should categorically deny motions to reconsider
previous rulings upholding jurisdiction and resist dismissing
claims entirely for procedural and fairness reasons.  If a court
does decide that it lacks personal jurisdiction because of ex-
traordinary circumstances, there are other options that it can
consider.  Depending on applicable law in the district or circuit,
a judge can use a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406, or 28 U.S.C. § 1631 if he or she believes the court is
wrongfully exercising jurisdiction over a corporate defendant or
particular claims.  A court can also attempt to fit the facts of
the case into one of Justice Ginsburg’s “exceptional cases” to
find jurisdiction, a category that will undoubtedly be shaped in
the coming years and one that could be used to “save” cases or
claims in danger of being entirely dismissed.  As cases against
corporate defendants are generally some of the cases that
spend the most time on the courts’ dockets, it is especially
important for judges to be mindful of any and all unfairness to
parties.
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